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Abstract— A rise in popularity of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs), attributed to more powerful GPUs and widely available
datasets, has seen them being increasingly used within safety-
critical domains. One such domain, self-driving, has benefited
from significant performance improvements, with millions of
miles having been driven with no human intervention. Despite
this, crashes and erroneous behaviours still occur, in part due
to the complexity of verifying the correctness of DNNs and a
lack of safety guarantees.
In this paper, we demonstrate how quantitative measures of
uncertainty can be extracted in real-time, and their quality
evaluated in end-to-end controllers for self-driving cars. To
this end we utilise a recent method for gathering approximate
uncertainty information from DNNs without changing the
network’s architecture. We propose evaluation techniques for
the uncertainty on two separate architectures which use the
uncertainty to predict crashes up to five seconds in advance.
We find that mutual information, a measure of uncertainty in
classification networks, is a promising indicator of forthcoming
crashes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning, and in particular Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs), have seen a surge in popularity over the past decade,
and their use has become widespread in many fields. This
increase in popularity, attributed to (i) more powerful GPU
implementations and (ii) the availability of large amounts
of data, has led to significant performance gains. DNNs
are now being deployed in safety-critical systems such as
medical diagnosis and, in particular, autonomous cars. The
latter are computationally efficient and have driven millions
of miles without human intervention [21], [5], but offer few
safety guarantees. Our lack of understanding of how DNNs
work [24], paired with the prohibitive difficulty of verifying
the correctness of DNNs of this magnitude [12], has led
to erroneous edge-case behaviours and unforeseen conse-
quences. Most notably, there have been crashes involving
autonomous cars that were a direct result of the self-driving
system malfunctioning. In May 2016, the autopilot feature
of a Tesla Model S caused a fatal accident when it failed to
distinguish the white side of a truck against the bright sky [4].
It is clear that, although DNNs are said to perform as well as
humans, there are still erroneous edge-case behaviours which
need to be detected, analysed and ultimately eliminated.
In this paper, we focus on end-to-end controllers for self-
driving cars, that is, DNNs mapping raw pixels from a front-
facing camera directly to steering instructions. End-to-end
learning-based approaches have been used in several existing
autonomous vehicle control systems, including the DARPA
Autonomous Vehicle (DAVE) project [16], and more recently
in NVIDIA’s PilotNet (formally known as DAVE-2) [1]. The
motivation for using an end-to-end controller is to remove
the need for complex, specifically coded scenarios, instead
allowing the network to define its own features based on
training.
When the entire control system is an end-to-end con-
troller (a DNN), as opposed to a collection of subsystems,
techniques such as uncertainty estimation can be employed
to more accurately assess the controllers confidence in the
decisions [17]. Model uncertainty is a measure of how unsure
a DNN model is in its prediction, and can be used to
understand if a model is under- or over-confident, as well
as to determine regions of input where more training data
is required [8]. With certain DNN activation functions such
as ReLU, model uncertainty increases as the input moves
further from the training data; this information can be used
to augment the training data accordingly. A recent technique
from Gal and Ghahramani [9] provides a simple, real-time
method to extract an estimation of model uncertainty using
any stochastic regularisation technique, which are a com-
mon feature of modern DNN models. This technique, and
dropout, our stochastic regularisation technique of choice,
will be explained in detail in Section III-B. The motivation
behind modelling uncertainty is to improve safety by creating
systems that take into account the confidence of the model
at each stage to avoid error propagation [17]. A meaningful
measure of system uncertainty can be used as a basis for
safe decisions.
This paper proposes quantitative evaluations of uncertainty
for use within end-to-end controllers for self-driving cars.
The key contributions are:
• We demonstrate how quantitative measures of uncer-
tainty can be extracted in real-time from end-to-end
controllers.
• We show how uncertainty thresholds can be chosen
and used to alert the operator to areas of low model
confidence.
• We evaluate the techniques on two modified PilotNet
[2] architectures, for both regression and classification
settings, within a driving simulator. We demonstrate
how to train these networks and how to select hyper-
parameters.
• We present preliminary results that show significant
changes in uncertainty, specifically mutual information,
up to five seconds before crashes.
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II. RELATED WORK
With the exception of [14], [15], DNN-based approaches
for autonomous driving do not often consider model uncer-
tainty. Recent work by Yang et al [23] has seen the addition
of discrete speed control prediction, along with steering
angle prediction, to end-to-end controllers for self-driving
cars. Their work aims to make DNN-based controllers more
viable, as steering angle alone is not sufficient for vehicle
control. The resulting multi-modal multi-task network was
shown to predict both steering angle and speed commands
accurately, but does not include the use of uncertainty for
any means.
Kendall et al’s paper on pixel-wise semantic segmentation
[14] utilised model uncertainty to improve segmentation
performance. In addition to this, they were able to show that
the highest areas of uncertainty occurred on class boundaries.
These results were reinforced by Kampffmeyer et al [13]
which considers several other methods and also concludes
that uncertainty maps are a good measure of uncertainty in
segmented images.
In 2016, Kendall and Cipolla [15] developed tools for
the localisation of a car given a forward facing photo. They
found that model uncertainty correlated to positional error;
test photos with strong occlusion resulted in high uncertainty
and the uncertainty displayed a linearly increasing trend with
the distance from the training set.
III. BACKGROUND
A. End-to-end controllers for self-driving
An end-to-end controller is a controller in which the end-
to-end process, from sensors to actuation, involves a single
DNN without modularisation. In the context of self-driving,
the sensors might include camera input, infrared (IR) sensors,
light detection and range sensors (LiDAR), or a combination
of these in addition to many others. The outputs are typically
steering angle, braking and acceleration values. In this paper,
we focus on up to three camera inputs, placed on the front of
the car facing forwards. The input to the network is therefore
up to three images, and the output is the desired steering
angle.
A typical feed-forward DNN consists of layers of neurons;
these neurons are connected via edges to neurons in different
layers. Each edge has a corresponding weight and each
neuron sums together the product of each input x and edge
weight W , then applies a non-linear activation function f
over the result: output = f(xW). Common choices for
activation functions include the sigmoid function [3] and the
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) [18]. Networks intended for
regression tasks have one output per continuous value to be
predicted, and a common loss function for optimisation is
the mean squared loss. Classification problems, in general,
have as many neurons in the output layer as classes, and the
final layer’s activation function is a “softmax” function (see
Equation 1). The most common loss function for classifica-
tion is the cross-entropy loss. For more detail, we refer the
interested reader to [10].
softmax(z) := [
ez1∑N
k=1 e
zk
, ...,
ezN∑N
k=1 e
zk
] (1)
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are commonly
used in self-driving and other image recognition tasks as they
reduce the number of network parameters, reduce training
time and prevent overfitting [10]. CNNs differ from DNNs
in that they include convolution layer(s). The output of a
neuron in a convolution layer is computed using only a small
region (window) of the layer before it is combined using a
convolution kernel. This closely resembles the human visual
system, suggesting that CNNs are well suited for vision
based tasks [10].
B. Bayesian uncertainty estimation
In many fields, uncertainty is used to determine the
dependability of a model. In self-driving, if the training set
of a model consisted of only images from highways and the
model was then given an image of a dirt track, the model
would return a steering angle but we would ideally require
the model to have high uncertainty as it would not have
seen this type of image before. In classification problems,
the softmax probabilities are not enough to indicate whether
the model is confident in its prediction, as a standard model
would pass the predictive mean (a point estimate) through
the softmax rather than the whole predictive distribution [7].
This leads to high probabilities (confidence) on points far
from the training data.
The above was an example of out-of-distribution test data.
Other examples of sources of uncertainty include noisy data,
and situations where many models explain the same dataset
equally (model parameter uncertainty). Noisy data is an
example of aleatoric uncertainty, whereas model parameter
uncertainty is an example of model uncertainty (or epistemic
uncertainty) [8], the confidence the model has in its predic-
tion, which is what this paper focuses on.
A recent technique from Gal and Ghahramani [9] allows
the gathering of approximate uncertainty information from
DNNs without changing the architecture (given that some
stochastic regularisation technique such as dropout has been
used). Dropout is a regularisation technique that sets 1-p
proportion of the dropout layers’ input to be 0, where p is
the dropout probability [11]. The dropped weights are often
scaled by 1/p to maintain constant output magnitude.
It has been shown that a network that uses dropout is an
approximation to a Gaussian process [9]. Equation 2 shows
how a prediction can be performed with a Gaussian process,
where f is the space of functions, X is the training data and
Y is the training outputs. The expectation of y* is called
the predictive mean of the model and the variance is the
predictive uncertainty.
p(y∗|x∗,X,Y) =
∫
p(y∗|f∗)p(f∗|x∗,X,Y)df∗ (2)
For a regression network, Equations 3 and 4 are used to
obtain an approximation of the predictive mean and variance
of the Gaussian process that the network is an approximation
of.
E(y∗) ≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
ŷ∗t (x
∗) (3)
Var(y∗) ≈ τ−1ID + 1
T
T∑
t=1
ŷ∗t (x
∗)T ŷ∗t (x
∗)
− E(y∗)TE(y∗)
(4)
The set {ŷ∗t (x∗)} of size T is the results from T stochastic
forward passes through the network. It is important that the
non-determinism from dropout is retained at prediction time
to ensure different units will be dropped per pass through.
Relating back to the Gaussian process, these are empirical
samples from the approximate predictive distribution seen
in Equation 2. τ relates to the precision of the Gaussian
process model, and is used in the calculation of the predictive
variance. τ can be calculated as seen in Equation 5, where
l is a user-defined length scale, p is the probability of units
not being dropped, N is the number of training samples and
λ is multiplier used in the L2 regularisation of the network.
τ =
l2p
2Nλ
(5)
A small length-scale (corresponding to high frequency
data) with high τ (corresponding to small observation noise)
will lead to a small weight-decay, which might mean the
model fits the data well but generalises badly. Conversely,
a large length-scale and low τ will lead to strong regulari-
sation. There is a trade-off between length-scale and model
precision. In practice, the model precision τ is often found
by grid searching over the weight decay λ to minimise vali-
dation error, choosing a length-scale that correctly describes
the data, and then putting the values into Equation 5. It can
also be found by grid searching over τ values directly.
For classification tasks, there are several methods of
obtaining uncertainty information. As previously mentioned,
softmax probabilities are a poor indicator as they are the
result of a single deterministic pass of a point estimate
through the network, which can lead to high confidence on
points far from the training data [8]. The three approaches
used in this paper to summarise classification uncertainty
are variation ratios [6], predictive entropy [20] and mutual
information [20].
Variation ratio is a measure of dispersion, its value is high
when classes are more equally likely and low when there is
a clear winner. Variation ratio, as with predictive uncertainty
in regression tasks, requires T stochastic forward passes
through the network for a test input x. A set of T labels yt
is collected, where yt is the class with the highest softmax
output of that pass through. The mode of the distribution c∗
and the number of times it was sampled fx can then be used
to obtain the variation ratio. These calculations can be seen
in Equations 6, 7 and 8.
c∗ = argmax
c=1,...,C
∑
t
1[yt = c] (6)
fx =
∑
t
1[yt = c∗] (7)
variation-ratio[x] := 1− fx
T
(8)
Predictive entropy captures the average amount of infor-
mation present in the predictive distribution, H[y|x,Dtrain].
In our setting the predictive entropy can be approximated by
collecting the softmax probability vectors over T stochastic
forward passes, and for each class, averaging the softmax
probability and multiplying it by the log of that average.
This can be seen in Equations 9 and 10, where fω is the
network with model parameters ω.
softmax(fω(x)) :=
[p(y = 1|x, ω̂t), ..., p(y = C|x, ω̂t)]
(9)
H˜[y|x,Dtrain] :=−
∑
c
(
1
T
∑
t
p(y = c|x, ω̂t))
· log( 1
T
∑
t
p(y = c|x, ω̂t))
(10)
The final measure is mutual information, I[y, ω|x,Dtrain].
Test points that maximise mutual information are points on
which the model is uncertain on average, but there are model
parameters that erroneously produce high confidence predic-
tions. Mutual information is calculated similarly to predictive
entropy, but with an extra term as seen in Equation 11.
I˜[y, ω|x,Dtrain] := (−
∑
c
(
1
T
∑
t
p(y = c|x, ω̂t))
· log( 1
T
∑
t
p(y = c|x, ω̂t)))
+
1
T
∑
c,t
p(y = c|x, ω̂t)logp(y = c|x, ω̂t)
(11)
Variation ratios and predictive entropy are both measures
of predictive uncertainty, whereas mutual information is a
measure of the model’s confidence in its output. Further
information on this can be found in [8]. Having multiple
measures of uncertainty is arguably more powerful than the
sole measure available for regression tasks, as it allows for
different types of uncertainty to be captured and gives us
more information about the performance of the model.
Fig. 1. The architecture of our regression network. ReLU is used as the
activation function, and dropout is applied after every layer but the first and
last with probability p = 0.05.
IV. METHODOLOGY
To investigate evaluation techniques of uncertainty in end-
to-end controllers for self-driving, we must (i) explore the
different types of uncertainty available from different net-
work architectures, (ii) assess the suitability of each network
architecture as a function of accuracy and uncertainty type,
(iii) calibrate thresholds for these uncertainties, and (iv) study
uncertainty levels in real-time in a simulator.
A. Network setup
As mentioned above, the inputs in our scenario are images,
of size 66x200x3 (RGB colour channels are retained), from
the Udacity self-driving car simulator [22]. Our desired
output is a steering angle. The simulator only allows for
angles between -25 and +25 degrees so the network is limited
to this range of values. We use two networks in this work,
one that treats the problem of predicting a steering angle as
a regression problem and one that treats it as a classification
problem.
Traditionally, steering angle prediction has been treated
as a regression problem. However, it has been shown that
posing regression tasks as classification tasks often shows
improvement over direct regression training [19]. In addition
to this, although theoretically continuous, steering angle
in the real-world is commonly a discrete variable due to
mechanical limitations.
Both architectures are heavily based on NVIDIA’s end-
to-end self-driving controller PilotNet [2]. The architecture
of the regression network, seen in Figure 1, has additional
dropout layers after every layer but the first and last, with
probability p = 0.05. An L2 regularizer with scale factor
λ = 1e − 6 was used on every layer but the final, and the
ReLU activation function (relu(x) = max(0, x)) was used
throughout. The loss function used was mean square error.
In calculating τ , the value l = 0.01 was selected after
a grid search experiment, because it, along with the value
selected for λ, produced the highest accuracy out of the
values searched over and matched values used in similar
experiments [9].
In order to frame the problem of predicting steering angles
as a classification problem, the training angles were bucketed
into one of two-hundred intervals (classes). As the simulator
Fig. 2. The architecture of our classification network.
has a limit of -25 degrees to +25 degrees, each bucket
has a precision of 0.25 degrees. The architecture of the
classification network can be seen in Figure 2; it also uses
ReLU activation functions, but has a softmax final layer and
uses the categorical cross-entropy loss function.
B. Network training
Both networks were trained on a dataset of 24,496 images
taken from the front centre of the car, with a random 20%
reserved for testing. 8037 of these images came from the
training dataset included in the Udacity self-driving car
challenge [22], the rest from data collected by the authors.
The data was then augmented by mirroring each image hor-
izontally and multiplying the steering angles by -1. For the
classification task, the steering angles were further bucketed
into their closest 0.25 degree interval. The speed of the car
in both data collection and testing was around 15mph.
Further data augmentation can be done, as the simulator
produces images from cameras at the left and right of the
car, as well as the front centre. These additional images
can be used with the original steering angle +/- a small
correction resulting from the deviation from the centre of
the car to the camera. It was found that, in this case, adding
the extra images did not change the accuracy of the network
sufficiently enough to include them so they were omitted.
Both networks were trained for 50 epochs with batch size
128.
C. Uncertainty extraction
At test time, each image x was copied T times into an
array {x1, ..., xT } which was passed to the network for
prediction. Non-determinism was retained by running the
network in training mode. Higher T increases processing
time but returns a more accurate representation of the predic-
tive distribution. The value of T used here was 128 to match
a single batch size; this provides a good trade-off between
processing time and accuracy.
For regression, this resulted in a 128 length vector where
the returned prediction was the mean (as in Equation 3) and
the variance was calculated according to Equation 4. The
value of τ was 0.00328.
For classification, this resulted in a 128x200 matrix where
each of the 128 rows represents the softmax output for
that particular pass through the network. The mode of the
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) An image generated by the manual labelling program and
classification network that was marked “safe”. (b) An image marked
“unsafe”.
maximum value in each row was taken to be the steering
angle prediction, and the three types of uncertainty defined
in Section III-B were calculated as seen in Equations 8, 10
and 11.
We found that extracting uncertainty information in real-
time was achievable if the number of stochastic forward
passes was limited to a single batch size. The simulator sends
an average of 6 frames per second to the receiver and we
were able to consistently match this rate on a desktop PC
with an Intel Core i5-6600 processor and 16GB RAM.
D. Uncertainty evaluations
In order for uncertainty information to be useful, we
examined two scenarios: whether any uncertainty measure
is significantly higher in places where the predicted angle
is visually incorrect, and whether any uncertainty measure
is significantly higher before a crash. These two scenarios
define our evaluation metrics.
1) Evaluation Metric One: For the first of the two investi-
gations, manually labelled ground truth data was collected by
writing a program to overlay the networks’ predicted angles
on the input images. It was then possible to manually decide
whether the angle was “safe” or would lead to a crash, which
was recorded to disk.
The criterion for “safe” was if, at the end of a straight
line from the centre of the car at the predicted angle, the
car did not deviate from the road (see Figure 3). The length
of the straight line represents roughly 3 seconds of travel
in the same direction but this will vary as the simulator car
does not always travel at a constant speed and this cannot
be controlled (only throttle value can be specified).
Another criterion for “safe” was briefly explored, where
a curved line was drawn, to represent the car continuing to
turn at the specified steering angle.
After manually labelling a set of 200 randomly selected
images from the test set, ROC curves comparing the true
and false positive rates for a range of uncertainty thresholds
were generated. If the uncertainty for an “unsafe” image was
above the threshold, it was marked as a true positive, whereas
if the uncertainty was above the threshold for a “safe” image
it was marked as a false positive.
2) Evaluation Metric Two: In the second scenario, eval-
uating whether uncertainty was significantly higher before a
crash, involved running the simulator and recording uncer-
tainty until a crash occurred. At that point, the uncertainty
value from n seconds before the crash was recorded, for n =
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and paired with a “crashed” label. Additional
“not crashed” data was recorded, where uncertainty from
n seconds before a normal driving state was paired with
a “not crashed” label. This data, for each n, was used to
generate ROC curves to determine both the best threshold
for uncertainty to predict “crashed” states that will occur in
n seconds, and to determine the most informative time n
before a crash.
V. RESULTS
A. Network performance
The best version of the regression network achieved an
RMSE of 0.1107 when using the predictive mean, a slight
improvement over 0.1211 when predicting deterministically.
In the simulator, the network drove around the track with an
average of two crashes per loop, but its movement was jerky.
For classification, the best iteration of the network
achieved an accuracy of 67% (and did not change when using
the mode of predictive distribution). This low accuracy could
be explained by the fact that the steering angles needed to be
converted to classes for classification, therefore losing some
granularity. It is also worth noting that wrong predictions
were frequently only a few classes away, so the predicted
angle may still have been classified as “safe”. Despite this
accuracy, the car consistently drove around the simulator
track with an average of zero to one crash per loop, and
although still jerky, it was smoother than the regression
network.
B. Incorrect angle prediction
The ROC curve for the regression network can be seen in
the first graph in Figure 4. Using predictive variance to judge
safe and unsafe road situations is only a slight improvement
on random guessing (AUC = 0.64 versus 0.5). The ROC
curves for each of the different uncertainty measures for
classification can also be seen in Figure 4. It is clear that
mutual information is most promising, with a high AUC
value of 0.77.
The most important value to minimise in self-driving and
crash prediction is false negatives (labelling unsafe situations
as safe) as these will lead to crashes. With this in mind,
a threshold with a high true positive rate was chosen to
minimise this value. The threshold for mutual information
was chosen as 0.612 which has a true positive rate of 0.81
and a false positive rate of 0.28. The threshold for entropy
was chosen as 3.51 and the threshold for variation ratio was
0.75.
C. Crash prediction
The graphs in Figure 5 show the value of uncertainty
for both regression and classification over the time period
leading to one of the crashes; the red line indicates the frame
at which the crash happened. Mutual information was once
again the strongest indicator of incorrect behaviour, in this
case meaning the car crashing. The mutual information in
this graph peaks at around 27 frames, or 4.5 seconds, before
the crash. Over the recorded crashes, the same uncertainty
Fig. 4. The ROC curves for uncertainty in regression (top left) and
classification (remaining plots) for incorrect angle prediction.
Fig. 5. The different uncertainty measures a number of frames before a
crash occurs. The red dashed line indicates the frame at which the crash
occurred.
peak can be seen from between 7-31 frames, 1.17-5.17
seconds, before the crash. Table I shows for the first five
crashes, the number of frames before the crash that the
threshold was first passed, and the location of the most
defined peak of mutual information before the crash.
Figure 5 shows the ROC curves for mutual information
for 2, 3, 4 and 5 seconds before the “crashed” or “not
crashed” event occurred, including values 0.25s either side
(i.e. “2 seconds before” encompasses from 1.75s to 2.25s).
Three seconds after a high mutual information value was
recorded was the most likely time for a crash to occur, and
the threshold for mutual information for this time step was
set to be 0.501, which had a true positive rate of 73% and a
Fig. 6. The ROC curves 2,3,4,5 seconds before a “crashed” or “not crashed”
event for mutual information.
TABLE I
DISTANCE IN FRAMES AND SECONDS FROM CRASH.
Crash # Distance to first threshold
breach
Distance to defined peak
(frames) (seconds) (frames) (seconds)
1 21 3.5 18 3
2 45 7.5 31 5.17
3 42 7 16 2.7
4 39 6.5 7 1.17
5 40 6.7 27 4.5
false positive rate of 28%.
This allows us to conclude that mutual information is a
promising indicator of incorrect behaviour in real-time, and
a time from highest peak to crash of 3 seconds could be
sufficient to take an appropriate action.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the use of uncertainty in end-
to-end controllers for self-driving cars and suggested new
evaluations for it. We studied two separate architectures,
one for regression and one for classification, along with the
tools to retrieve different types of uncertainty information
from them. We tested those architectures in the Udacity
self-driving car simulator and found that mutual information,
above all other uncertainty measures, is a promising predictor
for erroneous behaviour (crashes). All of the above runs in
real-time and we thus believe that uncertainty information
could play a major role in improving end-to-end controllers
and in bringing them up to speed with more traditional and
better performing modular controllers. Planned future work
includes varying the speed of the car to determine whether
any uncertainty measure is viable at higher speeds, as well as
modifying the simulator to include a top down view and the
ability to set the car speed directly, and finally exploring
a wider range of network architectures. It would also be
interesting to evaluate the techniques on real data.
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